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 EU DECISION-MAKING AFTER 
THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 
 
Youri Devuyst
* 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
 
 
Executive Summary: 
 
      This paper offers an institutional analysis of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. It identifies the Treaty-Constitution’s main implications for the 
decision-making process in the European Union (EU). While the aim was to streamline 
EU decision-making in light of the expansion from 15 to 25 Member States, the Treaty-
Constitution is characterised by numerous safeguard mechanisms. These are designed to 
preserve a high degree of Member State control over what is decided in terms of new 
constitutional, legislative or budgetary commitments in the EU. Veto-rights and blocking 
options have been retained, notably in procedures for the adoption and revision of the 
Treaty-Constitution as well as in a number of crucial policy fields. This is unlikely to 
foster a dynamic decision-making process in an expanded European Union of 25 Member 
States.  
 
This paper offers an institutional analysis of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe (henceforth called “the Treaty-Constitution”).  The aim is to identify  the 
Treaty-Constitution’s main implications for the decision-making process in the European 
Union (EU).  The  subsequent paragraphs will, in particular,  highlight  the Treaty-
Constitution’s impact on five points of permanent tension in the EU’s political system: 
 
-     veto-right versus efficiency in EU decision-taking (section 1); 
 
-     intergovernmental power-politics versus protection for the smaller Member States 
      (section 2); 
 
-     national versus European representation (section 3); 
 
-     personalisation of EU politics versus impersonal institutionalism (section 4); and 
 
-     “Christian Europe” versus separation between European public policy and religion 
      (section 5). 
 
If the Treaty-Constitution is ratified and enters into force, its legal-institutional 
provisions are important for the EU’s political process. As political scientists have 
rediscovered, institutions are significant notably because they contribute to “path 
dependence” (Bulmer, 1994; Pierson, 1996; Peters, 1999). This means that the outcome 
of political debates is shaped in large measure by earlier institutional choices such as the 
                                                 
*   The views expressed in this article are purely those of the author and may not be regarded as stating an 
official position of the institutions for which the author is or has been working.      
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possibility of adopting decisions by majority rather than unanimity. In this context, the 
Treaty-Constitution must be seen as the outcome of a negotiation process in which a 
variety of policy actors have tried to shift the EU’s institutional path in the direction that 
suits their substantive preferences.  
 
However, to examine the real impact of the Treaty-Constitution, an analysis of its 
legal provisions is not enough.  It is also necessary to look at the political climate in 
which the legal texts will be put into practice. The most important variable in this context 
is the manner in which the permanent tensions in the EU between solidarity and narrow 
self-interest are resolved (section 6).  
 
In the framework of this paper, there is space neither for a detailed overview of 
the Constitution’s negotiations, nor for an overall summary of its provisions. Suffice it to 
say that the Treaty-Constitution was drafted after earlier attempts to prepare the EU’s 
institutions for the expansion in membership from 15 to 25 – in the form of the Treaties 
of Amsterdam and Nice – had failed to deliver the expected changes (for the historical 
background, see Dinan, 2004, 283-289). The revision of the EU Treaties at Amsterdam 
and Nice had taken place in the framework of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) of 
representatives of the governments of the Member States. To provide for a broader and 
more transparent preparation of the Treaty-Constitution, the heads of state or government 
decided to convene a European Convention. It was composed of 15 representatives of the 
governments of the Member States (one from each Member State), 30 representatives of 
national parliaments (two from each Member State), 16 members of the European 
Parliament and two members of the European Commission. The candidate countries were 
represented in the same way.
1 In addition, the Convention was attended by observers of 
the Economic and Social Committee, the European social partners, the Committee of the 
Regions and the European Ombudsman. Former French President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing was appointed as Chairman of the Convention and former Italian and Belgian 
Prime Ministers Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene were chosen as Vice-Chairmen.
2  
 
The  European Convention prepared, but did not replace the traditional 
intergovernmental process leading to formal EU Treaty reform.
3 The approval of the 
Treaty-Constitution  still  required a consensus at an IGC. This  was achieved at the 
Brussels European Council of June 18, 2004. The Treaty-Constitution is expected to be 
formally signed in Rome on October 29, 2004.  Following the signing, the Treaty-
                                                 
1   The candidate countries represented at the Convention included those that became Member States in 
2004, as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. 
2   The documents of the European Convention can be consulted via its website:  
http://european-convention.eu.int. See also http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index .   
3   On the European Convention process, see Closa, 2004; Magnette, 2004; Norman, 2003; Wouters, 2003. 
For an overview and analysis of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, see Allen, 
2004; Klabbers and Leino, 2003; Kokott and Rüth, 2003; Peters, 2004; Philip and Soldatos, 2004; 
Traguth and Wessels, 2004; Triantafyllou, 2003.      
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Constitution needs to be ratified by all the Member States before it can enter into force 
(Art. IV-8). The ratification process is likely to be extremely difficult. 
 
One of the most significant results of  the European Convention  is the 
simplification of  the EU’s complex Treaty framework. As the fruit of fifty years of 
European integration, the EU’s primary law is made up of a large number of Treaties and 
Protocols. Over 700 articles form a complex and not very coherent whole, including both 
fundamental principles and institutional and more technical provisions (Commission 
2000, 2-3). The Treaty-Constitution replaces this set of earlier Treaties and provisions. It 
creates one European Union that has legal personality and absorbs the old European 
Community.
4  
 
 
1. Veto-right versus efficiency in EU decision-taking 
 
For more than a decade, a series of committees, think-tanks and institutions have 
repeated that the EU’s expansion in membership would have to go hand in hand with 
institutional change to protect the EU’s decision-making capacity. In that context, the 
European Commission in particular has argued that veto-rights needed to make place for 
majority decision-making. As the difficulty of arriving at unanimous agreement was 
expected to rise exponentially as the number of Member States increased, adherence to 
unanimity was seen as a recipe for stalemate (see, for instance, Commission 1992; 1996).   
 
At the start of the European Convention, veto-rights were influencing the EU’s 
decision-making capacity at three levels: 
 
-     at Intergovernmental Conferences, notably for the revision of EU Treaties; 
 
-     at the European Council, the framework in which the EU’s heads of state or      
      government meet; and  
 
-     at the Council of Ministers, in a selected number of important policy areas where     
unanimity has not yet made way for qualified majority voting. 
 
Intergovernmental Conferences for Treaty revision 
 
             In their report on The Institutional Implications of Enlargement, former Belgian 
Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, former G erman President Richard von Weizsäcker 
                                                 
4   Readers interested in the legal-philosophical debate on constitutionalism in the EU and on the “nature” 
of the Treaty-Constitution as a “contractual constitution” versus a “constitutional contract,” see 
Dehousse, 2003; Grimm, 2004; Lenaerts and Gerard, 2004; Piris, 1999; Weiler and Wind, 2003. The 
distinction between a “contractual constitution” and a “constitutional contract” was drawn by Lenaerts, 
2004. 
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and former UK Minister David Simon (1999, 12) suggested a division of the EU Treaties 
in two separate parts: 
 
 
The Basic Treaty would only include the aims, principles and 
general policy orientations, citizens’ rights and the institutional 
framework. These clauses ... could only be modified unanimously, through 
an IGC, with ratification by each Member State. Presumably such 
modifications would be infrequent. 
 
A separate text (or texts) would include the other clauses of the 
present treaties, including those which concern specific policies. These 
could be modified by a decision of the Council ... and the assent of the 
European Parliament. 
 
 
The Convention  did not really follow this suggestion.  A clear division of the 
Treaty-Constitution in two parts was believed to be too difficult: it would open a fierce 
debate between the Member States on the subjects to be put in the Basic Treaty. Instead, 
the European Convention decided to maintain the basic principle that any amendment to 
the provisions of any part of the Treaty-Constitution  should  remain subject to a 
unanimous agreement, followed by the ratification in all Member States (Art. IV-7). The 
negotiators foresaw, however, the extreme difficulty of changing the Treaty-Constitution 
in this manner  with 25 Member States.  They devised two (non-)solutions. First, the 
European Council would by unanimity be able to amend the provisions on each of the 
EU’s specific internal policy areas without an IGC. Still, such a decision would not come 
into force until it had been approved by the Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements (Art. IV-7b). Second, if two years after the 
signature of a revision, one or more Member States still encounter ratification difficulties, 
the matter would be referred to the European Council (Art. IV-7.4). 
 
The  fact that  the Treaty-Constitution can only be changed by unanimity is 
significant. The Treaty-Constitution systematically defines the objectives to be reached in 
each of the EU’s  policy areas and prescribes the policy instruments to be used for 
attaining those objectives. Thus, the scope of EU action in such areas as the internal 
market, competition policy, consumer protection and environment are fixed. This is not 
what one would traditionally find in a national constitution. It is rather what – at national 
level – would be included in a policy declaration at the start of a coalition government.  
 
As these  provisions are  – at the EU level  – part of the Treaty-Constitution, 
adapting the objectives or instruments in any specific policy area to new societal needs or 
new political insights will remain subject to veto-right. This is likely to foster stagnation. 
With 15 Member States, adopting EU Treaty amendments was an almost impossible task 
(Smith, 2002). With  25, the greater number of Member States and their increasing 
heterogeneity will only increase the level of difficulty.  
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Decision-making at the European Council 
 
The European Council is composed of the heads of state or government and the 
President of the Commission. It was created in 1974 to replace the irregular Summits 
which existed before. In the course of time, the European Council has gradually become 
directly involved in all important questions on the EU’s agenda ( de Schoutheete and 
Wallace, 2002; Picod, 2002). According to the Treaty-Constitution, the European Council 
“shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development, and shall define 
its general political directions and priorities” (Art.  I-20.1). In practice, the European 
Council “instructs” and “directs” the Council of Ministers ( Extraordinary European 
Council, September 21, 2001, 2).  
 
The European Council is an intergovernmental body that has traditionally worked 
by consensus (Dashwood, 2001). Its functioning is therefore easily blocked. Following 
the chaotic and unproductive European Council meeting  leading to the Treaty of Nice, 
even the British g overnment argued that the intergovernmental working method needed 
adaptation. In a joint letter, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
(2002)  suggested a  move away from systematic decision-taking by consensus in the 
European Council: “Decisions referred to the European Council under Treaty bases 
subject to qualified majority voting should be decided by qualified majority v oting. 
Failure to do so can impede progress in key areas,” they argued.
 Jack Straw (2002), the 
British Foreign Secretary, had earlier emphasised the necessity of finding a way to avoid 
paralysis in the European Council. He referred in particular to the failure of the Laeken 
European Council in December 1999  to achieve a decision  on the sites of several 
Community agencies. To avoid the repetition of such a blockage, Straw stated: “No one 
needs a repeat of the unedifying and unproductive stalemate we saw at Laeken. It would 
be absurd to require 25 or more countries to reach consensus on issues like these.” Still, 
that is precisely what the Treaty-Constitution does by specifying that the European 
Council generally takes its decisions by consensus (Art. I-20.4).  
 
Decision-making at the Council of Ministers 
 
The EU’s day-to-day decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers. Together 
with the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers decides on new EU legislation 
and on the annual budget. The Council of Ministers is also the crucial institution with 
respect to EU efforts at policy coordination in such areas as economic and employment 
policies. Decisions on the common foreign and security policy always take place in its 
framework.  
 
According to the Treaty-Constitution, decisions of the Council of Ministers shall 
generally be taken by qualified majority, except where provided otherwise (Art. I-22.3). 
Qualified majority voting  in the Council of Ministers has traditionally functioned as 
follows: each Member State received a number of votes on the basis of a political      
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deliberation.
5 A decision was adopted by qualified majority when a certain threshold was 
reached. In the EU-15, the total number of votes was 87. The threshold of the qualified 
majority  was set at 62. This threshold has been changed with each enlargement. In 
relative terms, however, the threshold always turned around 71% of the votes.  
 
The Treaty-Constitution adopted an entirely new method to arrive at a decision by 
qualified majority.  The idea was to simplify matters. According to the European 
Convention’s draft, a qualified majority would consist of the majority of the Member 
States representing at least three-fifths of the population of the Union. Following lengthy 
discussions at the IGC, the heads of state and government decided to add a series of 
“safeguards” to the new mechanism, making decision-taking much more difficult than 
proposed by the Convention. As specified in the final version of the Treaty-Constitution 
(Art. I-24), a qualified majority necessitates support by:  
 
-  at least 55% of the members of the Council; 
 
-  at least 15 Member States; and 
 
-  Member States comprising at least 65% of the EU’s population. 
 
Two further new rules were added. First, in order to prevent blockage by a limited 
coalition of large Member States, the Treaty-Constitution makes clear that a blocking 
minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority 
shall be deemed attained. Second, where a group of Member States somewhat less than a 
blocking minority is opposed to the adoption of a particular measure, the Council would 
be obliged to do all in its power to reach a satisfactory solution to address the concerns 
raised by the minority group. The Council’s attempt to find a solution must be achieved 
within a reasonable time and without prejudicing obligatory time limits.
6 The result is all 
but a simplification or streamlining of decision-taking in the Council. 
 
One of the purposes of the negotiations leading to the Treaty-Constitution was the 
extension of decision-making by qualified majority to the remaining areas under 
unanimity. The Treaty-Constitution did, indeed, extend qualified majority voting, but did 
                                                 
5   In the EU-15, the votes were weighted as follows: Belgium  5; Denmark 3; Germany 10; Greece 5; 
Spain 8; France 10; Ireland 3; Italy 10; Luxembourg 2; the Netherlands 5; Austria 4; Portugal 5; Finland 
3; Sweden 4; the United Kingdom 10.  
6    This procedure is inspired by the commitment made in Ioannina in March 1994 on the occasion of the 
discussions on the institutional aspects of the EU’s enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden. The 
technical aspects of the procedure are included in a Declaration re Article I-24 that is annexed to the 
Final Act of the Treaty-Constitution’s IGC. According to the Declaration, the renewed Ioannina 
procedure can be requested if members of the Council representing (a) at least three-quarters of the 
level of population, or (b) at least three-quarters of the number of Member States necessary to constitute 
a blocking minority indicate their opposition to the Council adopting an act by qualified majority.      
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not generalise  it  to all aspects of ordinary legislative work.
7  For decision-taking on 
taxation and social security, for instance, unanimity remains the rule. This also applies to 
the adoption of the EU’s multi-annual financial perspectives and the common foreign and 
security policy. To allow for a further movement in the direction of qualified majority 
voting, the Treaty-Constitution specifies that the European Council may  in the future 
authorise the Council of Ministers to act by qualified majority in certain types of cases 
currently governed by unanimity (Art. IV-7a.1). This decision itself is, however, subject 
to veto-right as the European Council must act by unanimity. Furthermore, each national 
parliament can block such a decision (Art. IV-7a.3). 
 
In a significant development – added during the IGC under the Italian and Irish 
Presidencies  – t he Treaty-Constitution on three occasions includes a provision that 
incorporates the most restrictive interpretation of the  infamous  compromise of 
Luxembourg of 1966 (for the background on this compromise, see Dinan, 2004, 104-108; 
Camps, 1966; Lambert, 1966). With regard to social security for migrant workers and in 
the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, any Member State can block the 
normal legislative procedure by stating that the proposed EU framework law would 
infringe the fundamental national principles of social security or of the legal system. In 
that case, the matter goes for discussion to the European Council and the legislative 
procedure is suspended (Art. III-21.2, III-171.3 and III-172.3). 
 
To overcome the tendency towards paralysis that is connected with veto-rights 
and consensus decision-making, the Treaty-Constitution includes updated provisions on 
enhanced cooperation (Art. I-43, III-322 – III. 329). This allows Member States wishing 
to go further in the integration process to establish closer cooperation among themselves. 
Those refusing the proposed way forward can stay on the side. However, the provisions 
on enhanced cooperation, as included in the Treaty-Constitution, provide no guarantee 
against paralysis. Enhanced cooperation is, indeed, subject to strict conditions and 
limitations. As such, one may wonder with Traguth and Wessels (2004) whether it will 
not remain “an inactive device confined to the realm of theoretical possibility.” In any 
case, enhanced cooperation provides no solution if the purpose is to build a Union with 
policies including  all 25 Member States. Instead of providing  the EU with  efficient 
decision-making methods, the Treaty-Constitution establishes a possibility for “selected 
separation.” This seems to signal a strong  doubt on the part of the negotiators as to 
whether the EU with 25 can work. 
 
 
2. Intergovernmental power-politics versus Community protection for the smaller    
    Member States 
 
The original Communities of the 1950s were built on mechanisms to ensure that 
reconciliation between the larger countries would not be at the expense of the smaller 
                                                 
7   According to Traguth and Wessels (2004), the Draft Treaty-Constitution, as produced by the European 
Convention, increased the number of cases where qualified majority could be used by 24, to 156 
articles.      
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countries (see, for instance, Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2003; de Schoutheete, 1997, 103). 
Avoiding the dominance of the smaller by the larger Member States was therefore an 
essential characteristic of the so-called Community method. Two institutional elements 
were particularly important in this context: 
 
-  The European Commission was created as the guardian of the Union’s general 
interest, both in the initiation and supervision of EU law. The Commission was to 
safeguard the smaller Member States from the pressures that are inherent in 
traditional intergovernmental frameworks; 
 
-  The division of the votes in the Council of Ministers was advantageous to the smaller 
Member States. 
 
The European Commission as the guardian of the Union’s general interest 
 
    The Commission’s role as the defender of the Union’s general interest has two 
main components: the Commission has the exclusive right to take the initiative for EU 
legislation and it is in charge of enforcing respect of Community rules by all Member 
States.  The Commission’s exclusive right to take the initiative in the EU’s legislative 
process was designed to ensure that the starting point for legislative discussions would be 
the general interest of the EU, not that of individual Member States. As a corollary, it was 
to help protect the smaller Member States against the dominance of the larger Member 
States.  
 
      Since the 1990s, the Commission’s role as the engine of the European 
integration process has been gradually taken over by the European Council. In practice, 
the heads of state or government have become the main agenda-setters for the EU: it is 
the European Council that decides which initiatives are to be taken with any chance of 
success. The European Council’s dominant role has changed the nature of EU decision-
taking. Unlike the European Commission, the European Council is intergovernmental in 
nature. Not only does it work by consensus, but the European Council also functions 
without the Community mechanisms designed to protect the smaller Member States. Like 
most traditional diplomatic conferences, it is dominated by the larger Member States. 
This was illustrated at the Nice European Council in December 2000. The French 
Presidency’s initial proposal at Nice on the re-weighting of the votes in the Council took 
the form of a tripling of the votes of the larger Member States and a doubling of those of 
the smaller Member States. This immediately put the latter on the defensive. According 
to Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres, the change amounted to nothing less 
than “an institutional coup d’état in favour of the big Member States” (European Report, 
December 13, 2000, I -5). In a comment made after Nice, veteran EU-observer 
Ferdinando Riccardi (Agence Europe, March 7, 2001, 3) expressed the following view: 
 
 
…  the increasingly pre-eminent role of the European Council is … 
dangerous, because the European Council could slide towards a ‘G8’-type 
mechanism, in which some essential elements of a Community are      
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lacking: the largest powers dominate, and no independent institution 
prepares decisions basing itself on the ‘general interest’, nor manages the 
follow-up to directions decided upon. To slide along that path would be 
the end of Community Europe. 
 
 
The Treaty-Constitution confirmed the intergovernmental  pre-eminence of the 
European Council as the real engine of the European integration process, notably by 
giving it the formal status of  an  EU institution (Art.  I-18.2).  In addition, its role is 
extended. For example in the field of justice and home affairs, it is the European Council 
that has the right to define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning 
(Art. III-159). It thus seems that, in the area of freedom, security and justice, the 
Commission will have to work  within the legislative planning established by the 
European Council. Still in the area of freedom, security and justice, the Commission’s 
right of initiative is accompanied by the right of initiative of a quarter of the Member 
States (Art. III-165). The Treaty-Constitution also creates the possibility for a citizens’ 
initiative. It prescribes that one million citizens may invite the Commission to submit a 
proposal for a legal act (Art. I-46.4).  
 
In addition to its role as initiator of the legislative process, the original Treaties 
put the European Commission in charge of supervising respect of EU rules by all 
Member States. As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission’s task is to ensure that EU 
law applies equally to all, large or small Member States. Here too, the Commission’s 
function has come under attack. A significant example concerned the application of the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  In November 2003, while the negotiations on the Treaty-
Constitution were ongoing, the Council of Ministers refused to follow the Commission’s 
recommendation for a decision against France and Germany, in accordance with the 
procedures of the Stability Pact. The Council recognised that the Commission’s economic 
analysis was correct and that France and Germany were maintaining an excessive budget 
deficit. Still, there was no qualified majority in the Council to draw the legal consequence 
that is laid down in the Stability Pact. France and Germany, which had been lobbying 
intensely to overturn the Commission’s recommendation, succeeded in blocking the 
proper application of Community law, with the help notably of the United Kingdom and 
Italy. The smaller countries (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden) had supported the Commission. The Commission immediately 
declared that it deeply regretted that the Council had not followed the spirit and the rules 
of the Pact. It  explicitly added that “only a rule-based system can guarantee that 
commitments are enforced and that all Member States are treated equally” (Council, 
2003, 15 and 18). For the smaller Member States, the episode signalled not only the 
political inequality of the Member States. It also  focused their attention  on  the 
simultaneous debate on the re-weighting of the votes in the Council of Ministers in the 
framework of the Treaty-Constitution. 
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The method of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers 
 
      The discussion on the re-weighting of the votes in the Council of Ministers was 
the most divisive issue during the negotiation of the Treaty-Constitution. It concerned a 
key question in the relationship between larger and smaller Member States. According to 
the original Community method, the smaller Member States had been allocated a 
relatively higher share of votes than the larger Member States. For instance, in the EU-
15, Belgium with ten million inhabitants had five votes. Germany with its 82 million 
inhabitants had only ten votes. During the negotiations over the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
France in particular had argued that, following the accession of several smaller Member 
States, the original distribution of Council votes was causing an exaggerated over-
representation of the smaller countries. In consequence, France was asking for a re-
weighting of the votes to the advantage of the large Member States. The issue was 
discussed, but not settled at Amsterdam (Devuyst, 2003, 63-67).  
 
      During the negotiation of the Treaty of Nice, a complex political compromise 
was reached that was designed to accommodate France and the other larger Member 
States.
8 Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy went from 10 to 29 votes. Spain 
and Poland,  though having 20 million fewer inhabitants than a country like France, 
nevertheless received 27 votes. Smaller middle-sized countries (like Greece, Belgium and 
Portugal) went from 5 to 12 votes. In other words, the number of votes of the larger 
Member States was almost tripled. The votes of the smaller Member States somewhat 
more than doubled. As a result, the overrepresentation of the smaller Member States was 
– in relative terms – somewhat reduced. In addition, the Treaty of Nice made it more 
difficult to adopt a decision without the support of the larger Member States. It stipulated 
that any member of the Council would be able to request verification that the qualified 
majority comprises at least 62% of the total population of the Union. Should that 
condition not be met, the decision would not be adopted. 
 
During the European Convention, the negotiators were striving for a 
simplification of this  mechanism. As indicated above, they proposed that a qualified 
majority would consist of the majority of the Member States, representing at least three-
fifths of the population of the Union. As described in section 1 of this paper, the end-
result is significantly more complex. Several factors played a role in the final 
compromise: 
 
 
                                                 
8   Nice Protocol on Enlargement of the European Union, art. 3: Germany 29 votes (82 million 
inhabitants); United Kingdom 29 (59 million); France 29 (59 million); Italy 29 (58 million); Spain 27 
(39 million); Netherlands 13 (16 million); Greece 12 (11 million); Belgium  12 votes (10 million); 
Portugal 12 (10 million); Sweden 10 (9 million); Austria 10 (8 million); Denmark 7 (5 million); Finland 
7 (5 million); Ireland 7 (4 million); Luxembourg 4 (400,000 thousand). For the new Member States, the 
weighting of the votes was fixed as follows: Poland 27; Czech Republic 12; Hungary 12; Slovakia 7; 
Lithuania 7; Latvia 4; Slovenia 4; Estonia 4; Cyprus 4; Malta. 3.      
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-  The population threshold:  Spain and Poland  insisted on preserving  the blocking 
capacity they had obtained in the Treaty of Nice.
9 France insisted that the Member 
States that choose to block a decision must represent a significant percentage of the 
EU’s population to prevent a faction of small  states stopping the decision-making 
process. This explains why the threshold in terms of population  was increased to 
65%; 
 
-  The Member State threshold: the smaller Member States wanted the gap between the 
population and the Member State thresholds to be small. This was to protect their 
position in comparison with the larger Member States. The Irish Presidency proposed 
to stick to the Convention proposal for a 10% gap as a reasonable balance. As a 
result, the Member State threshold was set at 55%. In addition, the negotiators agreed 
to add that a qualified majority would need support of at least 15 Member States. This 
was intended to convince the smaller countries that they could accept the 
compromise; 
 
-  A blocking minority requires at least four Member States: this provision was intended 
to prevent a blocking coalition composed of France, Germany and Belgium (i.e. “old 
Europe” opposed to the war in Iraq); 
 
-  The renewed Ioannina clause: Poland, in particular, was worried about a loss of 
blocking power in  comparison with Nice.  Poland therefore insisted on further 
safeguards for the minority. This resulted in the Declaration allowing a group of 
Member States (below the minority necessary to prevent the qualified majority) to 
invoke a conciliation phase during which a satisfactory solution would be sought. 
 
In spite of the many  safeguards, the qualified majority system proposed in the 
Treaty-Constitution puts the smaller Member States on the defensive in comparison to 
what they were used to under the Community method.  Indeed, as it abolishes the 
traditional distribution of the votes in exchange for a decision-making method based on 
real demographic weight, the Treaty-Constitution shifts the equilibrium between larger 
and smaller countries to the advantage of the latter.  Using the Member States’ full 
demographic weight in Council voting is not as obviously justified as it might seem. The 
population factor already plays its role in the decision-taking of the European Parliament. 
Representation of the European citizens in the European Parliament follows the logic of 
degressive proportionality, ensuring a minimum representation for the smallest Member 
States (Art. I-19.2). In most federal systems, population weight is the dominant factor in 
one, but not in both chambers of parliament. The most explicit example is the United 
States Congress. The U.S. House of Representatives is composed in a proportional 
manner. The U.S. Senate consists of two representatives of each State, whatever its size. 
Each Representative and Senator has one vote only. In the European Union after the 
Treaty-Constitution, a different logic is followed, giving a particularly strong position to 
the larger Member States: one vote for each Member of the European Parliament and 
                                                 
9   For the background of the Spanish and Polish position, see Roig Moles, 2003; Parzymies, 2003.      
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voting power proportionate to a Member State’s population (albeit with safeguards) in the 
Council of Ministers.  
 
The formation of “directoires”? 
 
      An additional point of friction during the negotiation of the Treaty-Constitution 
was the complaint by the smaller Member States against the perceived tendency towards 
the formation of big power “ directoires” (Ash, Mertes and Moïsi, 2003; de Bresson, 
2004; Stark, 2002-2003). In the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, D.C. in September 2001, for instance, Chirac, Blair and Schröder found it 
necessary to  discuss matters  repeatedly  in a restricted circle. In 2003-2004, after all 
formal EU meetings had been expanded from 15 to 25, Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom again held a series of bilateral and trilateral mini-summits.  The smaller 
Member  States reacted  with virulence against the “ directoire” tendency.  Austrian 
Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, for instance, stated that “the European idea [was being] 
undermined” by the mini-summits and that all EU Member States had the right to be 
treated as “equal members” (Agence Europe, November 11, 2001, 4). 
 
 
3. National versus European representation 
 
      During the negotiations over the Treaty-Constitution, two important discussions 
took place regarding national or European representation in E U decision-making. The 
first debate concerned the composition of the European Commission. The second dealt 
with the role of national parliaments in EU decision-shaping. 
 
The composition of the European Commission 
 
      During the negotiations over the Treaty-Constitution, one of the most difficult 
discussions concerned the composition of the European Commission, given the 
expansion to 25 Member States. Traditionally, the Commission always included at least 
one national from each Member State, with a second Commissioner from Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Continuing this system after the 
enlargement of 2004 would imply a college of 30 members or more. 
 
  France in particular insisted on the need to reduce the number of 
Commissioners. The idea of an “efficient and small Commission” was, however, viewed 
with great suspicion by the smaller Member States (CONFER/VAR 3951/00 ff). They 
insisted on the right to keep a national Commissioner. For the Austrian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, it was crucial to maintain the information flows between the 
Commission and each Member State  through direct representation of all states in the 
college ( Agence Europe, January 18, 2001, 3). The Portuguese State Secretary for 
European Affairs argued that reducing the number of Commissioners meant that the 
Commission would de facto be run at the level of the senior officials where the large 
Member States are better “represented” than the smaller Member States (Agence Europe, 
November 11, 2000, 6; European Report, October 18, 2000, I-7). The Finnish Prime      
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Minister feared that by eliminating the link between the college of Commissioners and 
each Member State, the Commission’s legitimacy would be undermined (Lipponen, 
2000). 
 
During the negotiations over the Treaty of Nice, the final compromise formula 
was that the Commission would be composed of one national for each Member State 
until the EU consisted of 27 Member States. At that time, the number of Commissioners 
would be reduced to less than the number of Member States. The European Convention 
had another approach. According to the Convention, the European Commission would 
consist of 15 persons selected on the basis of a system of simple rotation between the 
Member States. In addition, the Commission President would appoint non-voting 
Commissioners coming from all other Member States. Several of the smaller Member 
States expressed their objection to the idea of a Commission that would include “second 
class” Commissioners. 
 
  In the end, the heads of state or government decided in June 2004 that the first 
Commission to be appointed under the provisions of the Treaty-Constitution shall 
continue to consist of one national of each Member State (I-25.5). Thereafter, the number 
of Commissioners was fixed at two-thirds of the number of Member States. The selection 
among the nationals of the Member States would take place on the basis of a system of 
equal rotation between the Member States (I-25.6). 
 
  The main significance of this discussion is not so much the exact number of 
Commissioners to be appointed, but rather the importance that the Member States attach 
to this issue. According to the Treaties, Commissioners must act in a completely 
independent manner and shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or 
other body. However, the Member States continue to see the Commissioner of their 
nationality as  “their own” national representative. Several Member States  feared that, 
without a “national representative,” the Commission  would neglect their interests. This 
explains why they insisted on a Declaration to be incorporated in the IGC’s Final Act, 
which underlines that the Commission should liaise closely with all Member States, 
whether or not they have a national serving as Commissioner. In addition, the Declaration 
states that the Commission should take all the necessary measures to ensure that political, 
social and economic realities in all Member States, including those which have no 
national serving as a Commissioner, are fully taken into account. 
 
The role of the European Parliament and the national parliaments 
 
      To the Community’s founders, its democratic nature seemed self-evident since it 
was based on democratic Member States (Featherstone, 1994). Moreover, the ECSC 
Treaty provided for a Common Assembly composed of delegates from the national 
parliaments of the Member States. Upon the entry into force of the EEC and Euratom 
Treaties, the powers of the Assembly were extended to the new Communities. The 
Assembly changed its name to European Parliament in 1962. The first direct elections of 
the European Parliament took place in 1979. 
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      In the 1950s, the Assembly’s powers were largely consultative. This is no longer 
the case: the European Parliament now exercises crucial budgetary and legislative 
powers, on  an  equal footing with the Council of Ministers. The Treaty-Constitution 
continued the logic of increasing the European Parliament’s co-decision powers. 
Simultaneously,  another institutional development seemed to be undermining 
Parliament’s newly-gained legislative powers:  this development was the EU’s tendency 
to coordinate national practices through the non-legislative open method of coordination. 
In the open co-ordination method, the Member States define certain policy objectives by 
common accord in the Council. The European Parliament, however, is largely absent in 
decision-shaping on matters falling under the open method of coordination. Parliament 
has therefore warned explicitly that the open method of co-ordination “must under no 
circumstances lead to hidden parallel legislation by circumventing the legislative 
procedures established in the EC Treaty” (European Parliament, 2001, para. 37). The 
Treaty-Constitution is silent on this issue. 
 
      Since the first direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979, members of 
the European Parliament are no longer appointed by the national parliaments. The 
organic link that existed between national parliaments and the European integration 
process before 1979 thus disappeared. However, proposals for the creation of a second 
EU chamber representing the national parliaments have traditionally received a negative 
reaction from the European Parliament, which sees itself as the legitimate representative 
of the European population in EU decision-making.  
 
      Still, only national parliaments can effectively exercise political control over the 
positions taken by their national ministers in the Council. The European Parliament is 
unable to do this, as it cannot sanction national governments. The degree to which 
national parliamentary institutions are actually exercising this control differs greatly from 
one Member State to the next. In a large number of Member States, national parliaments 
hardly discuss the positions taken by their national ministers in the Council.  
 
      In order to enable them to exercise their right of control, the Member States 
agreed in the context of the Treaty of Amsterdam that national parliaments had to be 
informed in a timely fashion of proposals for EU legislation. The European Convention 
decided to go further down this road. In a Protocol on the role of national parliaments in 
the EU, the Treaty-Constitution envisages encouraging a greater involvement of national 
parliaments in the activities of the EU and enhancing their ability to express their views 
on legislative proposals. The Protocol stipulates  inter alia that  all Commission 
consultation documents and legislative proposals sent to the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers shall be simultaneously forwarded to the national parliaments. To 
allow for debate in the national parliaments, the Protocol adds that a six-week period 
shall normally elapse between the receipt of the legislative proposals by the national 
parliaments and their  inclusion i n the agenda of the Council of Ministers. National 
parliaments receive a particular role in the application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
According to the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality that was added to the Treaty-Constitution, any national parliament can 
address a reasoned opinion to the EU institutions s tating  why it considers that a      
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Commission proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. When at least 
one-third of the national parliaments object, the Commission will be obliged to review its 
proposal and decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw it. This “safeguard” was 
added to protect the national legislatures against the “threat” of a further erosion of their 
powers to the EU level. 
 
While the European Parliament has traditionally opposed the creation of a second 
parliamentary chamber composed of national parliamentarians, it has never objected to 
the so-called “Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of 
Parliaments of the European Union” (generally known under its French abbreviation 
COSAC). COSAC is a cooperation framework between committees of the national 
parliaments dealing with European affairs as well as representatives from the European 
Parliament. It was created in 1989. At the biannual meetings of COSAC, six members 
represent each parliament. COSAC was formally recognised in the Amsterdam Protocol 
on the role of National Parliaments (para. 4). According to this Protocol, COSAC is 
allowed to address any "contributions" to the EU institutions that it deems necessary, in 
particular on the EU’s legislative proposals. This is confirmed by the Treaty-Constitution. 
 
 
4. Personalisation of EU politics versus impersonal institutionalism 
 
While trying to achieve their economic and political objectives, the Community’s 
founders repeatedly emphasised that the success of the European integration effort would 
depend to a large extent on getting the institutional framework right (Monnet, 1976, 373; 
Duchêne, 1994, 205). Monnet, in particular, had a strong belief in the cumulative sagacity 
of institutions.
10 The negotiators of the Treaty-Constitution, instead of focusing on the 
strengthening of the EU institutions as such, concentrated especially on the creation and 
reinforcement of individual functions within the institutions. The Treaty-Constitution 
notably creates the new functions of President of the European Council and of Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. In addition, it reinforces the role of the President of the 
European Commission.  
 
The President of the European Council 
 
      Before the Treaty-Constitution, the Presidency of the European Council was 
occupied by the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The 
office of President was thus held, in turn, by each Member State for a term of six months. 
The Presidency of the European Council could therefore not be seen as a personal 
mandate. Each Member State had as such, the duty of performing this task as its turn 
came.  
                                                 
10   Jean Monnet was fond of quoting Swiss philosopher Henri Frédéric Amiel: “Each man begins the world 
afresh. Only institutions grow wiser; they store up their collective experience; and, from this experience 
and wisdom, men subject to the same laws will gradually find, not that their natures change but that 
their behaviour does” (Duchêne, 1994, 401).      
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      Over the years, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and of the European 
Council gradually adopted the central political role in the EU’s decision-making system 
(Tallberg, 2003). While the Treaties only gave a very incomplete picture of the 
Presidency’s powers, in practice, the rotating Presidency fulfilled the following functions: 
 
-  it was the central agenda-setter for all European Council and Council of Ministers 
meetings; 
 
-  it prepared and chaired every European Council and Council of Ministers meeting as 
well as the preparatory working parties and committees; 
 
-  it drew the conclusions after each meeting; 
 
 
-  it was expected to lead whenever political compromise formula and new initiatives 
needed to be invented; 
 
-  and it represented the European Council and Council of Ministers in contacts with the 
other institutions, third countries and the media. 
 
      The Council Presidency thus exercised the EU’s central political functions, in 
particular in intergovernmental domains such as the common foreign and security policy. 
At the same time, the task of the Presidency was becoming ever more difficult because of 
the larger number of subjects to be dealt with and the greater diversity among the 
expanding number of Member States. Even for the most capable national administration, 
the Presidency constituted an exhausting experience.  
 
      The Presidency of the European Council constituted an important element in the 
debates during the European Convention. British Prime Minister Tony Blair (2002, 4) 
was one of the most outspoken critics of the rotating Presidency system. In Blair’s words: 
 
 
The six-monthly rotating Presidency was devised for a Common Market 
of 6: it is not efficient nor representative for a Union of 25 and more. 
How can the Council, with constantly shifting leadership, be a good 
partner for the Commission and Parliament? How can Europe be taken 
seriously at international Summits if the Chair of the Council is here 
today, gone tomorrow? The old system has reached its limits. It creates 
for Europe a weakness of continuity in leadership: a fatal handicap in the 
development of an effective common foreign and security policy. 
 
 
      Blair, as well as Chirac and Schröder, emphasised instead the need for a full-
time President of the European Council (Agence Europe, January 17, 2003, 24). But 
several of the smaller Member States and the Commission  saw the proposals for a 
permanent President of the European Council as a threat to the Community system. They      
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asked what the permanent European Council President would be doing for the other 360 
days of the year when the European Council would not  be  meeting and when the 
American President would not be searching for the mythical single phone number for 
“Europe”. They feared that a permanent chairperson of the European Council might 
become a duplicate or rival of the Commission President, create his own staff and open 
up a rift in the EU’s institutional system (Prodi, 2002; Verhofstadt, 2002). 
 
      Still, the Convention adopted the proposal for a permanent chair. According to 
the Treaty-Constitution, the European Council shall elect its President, by qualified 
majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. The President may not 
simultaneously hold a national mandate. In addition to the chairing of meetings, the tasks 
of  the President include driving forward the European Council’s work, ensuring its 
proper preparation and continuity, facilitating cohesion and consensus within the 
European Council and ensuring the external representation at his or her level (Art. I-21). 
Whether the new function will lead to a real rivalry with the Commission is uncertain. 
However, with a job description  that includes driving forward the European Council’s 
work, ensuring its proper preparation and continuity, and facilitating cohesion and 
consensus, it is clear that the Presidency of the European Council could be developed into 
the EU’s leading permanent political position. 
 
The Union Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
      The Treaty-Constitution established the new post of Union Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (Art. I-27). The Minister will take up the functions that were held before by two 
persons: the European Commissioner for external relations and the High Representative 
for the common foreign and security policy (who was at the same time Secretary General 
of the Council secretariat).  
 
  The general feeling throughout the Member States, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament was that the existence of the office of High Representative 
in the Council in tandem with the Commissioner for external relations was inefficient and 
unsuited to the integrated nature of international affairs (CONV 459/02). To remedy this 
situation, it was proposed that the tasks of the High Representative and Commissioner for 
external relations be entrusted to one person (European Parliament, 2000, para. 68; Prodi, 
2001).  
 
  The Treaty-Constitution stipulates that the European Council, acting by qualified 
majority with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Union Minister shall at the same time be one of the 
Vice-Presidents of the Commission. His or her essential task will be to coordinate the 
EU’s external action. On the one hand, the Union Minister will carry out the common 
foreign and security policy as mandated by the Council of Ministers. On the other hand, 
(s)he shall be responsible  within the European Commission  for handling external 
relations. Only for the responsibilities  thus exercised within the Commission will the 
Union Minister be bound by Commission procedures. The status of the Union Minister is 
therefore somewhat ambiguous. It seems that s(he) is in the first instance an agent of the      
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Council. I t is  the European Council that can end his or her tenure at any moment. 
Furthermore, the Union Minister will chair the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. 
As such, the chair of the Council for Foreign Affairs will be represented directly in the 
Commission.  
 
The President of the European Commission 
 
During the negotiations for the Treaty of Nice, attempts to drastically reduce the 
number of Commissioners had been resisted. To, nevertheless, maintain efficiency in the 
Commission’s functioning, the Treaty of Nice opted for a strengthening of the Commis-
sion President’s powers. The Treaty-Constitution further consolidates the  President’s 
leading role within the Commission. From a role of primus inter pares, the President has 
gradually become the real  chef. The T reaty-Constitution notably stipulates that the 
President shall lay down guidelines within which the Commission  will work and will 
decide its internal organisation, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and on a 
collegial basis. The President selects the members of the European Commission  upon 
proposal of the Member States  and appoints the Vice-Presidents. Members of the 
Commission must resign if the President so requests (Art. I-26). 
 
 
5. “Christian Europe” versus separation between European public policy and  
     religion 
 
      A new dimension, explicitly introduced in the EU’s decision-making system by 
the Treaty-Constitution, is the principle of participatory democracy. According to the 
Treaty-Constitution, the EU’s institutions shall give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all 
areas of the EU’s action. The institutions shall “maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society” (Art. I-46). In addition to this 
general provision, the Treaty-Constitution contains a specific article in which the EU 
recognises the identity and specific contribution of churches, religious associations and 
non-confessional organisations (Art.  I-51). The article specifies that the Union shall 
maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations 
(for the context, see Hölscheidt and Mund, 2003). 
 
      The article on churches in the Treaty-Constitution did not appear out of the blue. 
During the  earlier  negotiations o ver the Treaty of Amsterdam, German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl had suggested inserting a paragraph in the Treaty emphasising Europe’s 
Christian values and the role of the churches in European construction. This resulted in a 
non-binding Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations. It 
simply underlined that the EU respects and does not prejudice the status under national 
law of churches and equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional 
organisations ( Marcus-Helmons, 1998; van Bijsterveld, 1999). The churches were 
disappointed by this Declaration. They also complained when the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, proclaimed in December 2000, failed to include  an explicit      
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reference to God or to recognise the EU’s Christian origins. Instead, the Charter’s 
preamble referred to the EU’s “spiritual and moral heritage.” 
 
      Following several statements by Pope John Paul II, the churches continued their 
offensive during the negotiation of the Treaty-Constitution, notably through the activities 
of the Conference of European Churches and the Commission of the Bishops 
Conferences of the European Community  (Triebel, 2003a and 2003b). They received 
strong political support from Catholic countries such as Poland and Italy, as well as from 
the European People’s Party and several members of the Convention (see, for instance, 
CONV 480/03, January 10, 2003). France and  Belgium  strongly disagreed with 
references  to religion in the Treaty-Constitution, which in their opinion would be 
contrary to the tradition of secularism in public policy.  
 
      In the end,  the Convention and  the  IGC rejected appeals for an explicit 
recognition of Europe’s Christian roots in the Treaty-Constitution’s preamble. Instead, it 
refers to “the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe.” However, i n a 
major concession to the churches,  the European Convention  did  lift the Amsterdam 
Declaration into  the  Treaty-Constitution itself, including the new paragraph on the 
dialogue with the churches and philosophical organisations. The article on the dialogue 
with churches  continues to create controversy.  The European Humanist Federation 
(2004), for instance, rejects the article as it seems to give religious institutions a right of 
interference in the exercise of European public powers.  
 
  The fact that the issue emerged as a major political topic during the European 
Convention is firstly indicative of the fact that the EU is currently dealing with practically 
all aspects of life, including ethical questions on which the churches wish to influence EU 
policy. Secondly, the political intensity with which this issue was discussed was closely 
linked to the debate about a possible Turkish accession. Thirdly, the debate on the place 
of religion in the EU was also stimulated by the participation in the Convention of the 
new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe.  Poland  in particular  sees 
Christianity as its main national characteristic and symbol of resistance against atheist 
Communism. 
 
 
6. Community solidarity versus narrow self-interest 
 
  The paragraphs above have put the emphasis on the Treaty-Constitution. 
However, the legal provisions of the Treaty-Constitution as such do not provide the full 
picture of the developments in EU decision-making. One of the most important aspects is 
the political climate in which the legal provisions will be interpreted and implemented. In 
this respect, one of the crucial questions is the degree to which the 25 Member States will 
balance their legitimate national interests with a degree of EU solidarity and Community 
spirit.  
 
  The Treaty-Constitution made the concept of solidarity in the EU more 
conspicuous, notably by adding an explicit “solidarity clause” in which the Union and its      
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Member States commit themselves to act jointly, in a spirit of solidarity, if a Member 
State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster (Art. I-42). In 
addition, the Treaty-Constitution foresees the possibility o f introducing closer 
cooperation as regards mutual defence in case one of the Member States is the victim of 
armed aggression (Art. I-40.7). 
 
  Even before the Treaty-Constitution, solidarity played an important role during 
EU decision-making. The process  of  drafting  EU law is characterised by constant 
attempts to avoid the marginalization of particular Member States (Nickel, 1998).
 In this 
context, the EU’s legislation is often accompanied by assurances in the form of transition 
periods and – less frequently – specific derogations for Member States facing particular 
problems (for examples, see de Schoutheete, 103).  
 
  EU solidarity also takes a financial form through the transfer of financial means 
from the rich  countries to the needier regions via the Community’s budget allocations 
from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. While representing less than 5% of the 
budget in 1975, cohesion spending increased to 35% in 2004. However, financial 
solidarity is also very much under pressure. During the negotiation of the so-called 
Agenda 2000 regarding the EU’s financial perspectives for the period between 2000 and 
2006, Germany, backed by the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria, called for a mechanism 
to correct budgetary imbalances. Their purpose was to obtain a cut in their net 
contribution to the EU budget. At the start of the debate, German Chancellor Schröder 
declared that it had become necessary to change traditional German policy. “In the past,” 
he said, “many of the necessary compromises could be achieved because the Germans 
have paid for them. This policy has come to an end” (Der Spiegel, January 4, 1999, 44). 
The view that the budget returns should be equivalent to budget contributions – the so-
called “juste retour” theory – was strongly condemned in the European Parliament. Jutta 
Haug (1999, 17),  the Parliament’s rapporteur on the issue, underlined that the “ juste 
retour” attitude was “contrary to the indivisible nature of the financial and non-financial 
rights, benefits and obligations deriving from Union membership and from the principle 
of solidarity between the Member States.” The most significant result of this discussion 
was the overall reduction in EU funding. In 1999, the ceiling for total appropriations for 
EU payments stood at 1.24% of the EU’s combined GDP (Commission, 1999, table 16). 
The financial perspectives agreed at the Berlin European Council aimed at reducing this 
level from 1.13% in 2000 to 0.97% in 2006. This caused sharp criticism by the European 
Parliament (1999,  para. 4 -5), which regretted that  – at times when more action is 
expected from the EU in a host of areas – EU solidarity risked ending up as mere rhetoric 
in view of the Member States’ tendency to retreat behind their own budget walls.  
 
  Financial solidarity reappeared on the agenda with the start of the debate for the 
multi-annual financial perspectives f rom 2007 to 2013. At Nice, the heads of state and 
government had made sure that each Member State retained its veto with respect to the 
adoption of those multi-annual perspectives.  During the negotiations of the Treaty-
Constitution, the Dutch Finance Minister insisted that the Netherlands would never give 
up the right to veto the financial perspectives. In his words, the Netherlands was “not 
going to allow our public treasury to be pillaged due to a decision made by a majority”      
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(Agence Europe, April 23, 2004, 7). In the end, the Dutch position was accepted by the 
other Member States. The Treaty-Constitution stipulates that the multi-annual financial 
framework shall be laid down by unanimity in the Council of Ministers (Art. I-54). 
 
  The spirit in which the budgetary  negotiations would take place was  further 
clarified by a letter of December 2003 from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. These net contributors asserted that the EU budget 
should be frozen at the level of a  maximum of  1% of the EU’s combined GDP. The 
Commission reacted immediately to the common letter, stating that under those 
circumstances it would no longer be possible for the EU to fulfil its solidarity mission. 
The debate revealed the degree to which the heads of state and g overnment were 
reasoning in terms of their narrow self-interest rather than in the EU’s general long-term 
interest. While the Treaty-Constitution tended  – in formal terms  – to increase the 
importance of the solidarity concept, it did not always translate into political practice. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
      The Treaty-Constitution confirms the hybrid,  sui  generic  nature of the EU 
political system. On the one hand, the EU goes beyond what can be expected from a 
traditional international organisation. In particular, it will continue to create secondary 
legislation that is approved through co-decision with the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers, often deciding by qualified majority rather than unanimity. The 
Treaty-Constitution stipulated that EU law established in this manner has primacy over 
national law (Art. I-5a). On the other hand, the EU’s supranational competences have 
been strictly limited. This is confirmed by the Treaty-Constitution which lays down that 
the EU shall have exclusive competence only with respect to monetary policy (for the 
Member States that have adopted the euro), competition rules (only in so far as necessary 
for the functioning of the internal market), the common commercial policy, the customs 
union, and the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries 
policy (Art. I-12).  In addition, the EU  may issue legislation in areas where the Union 
shares competence with the Member States such as the internal market, environment, 
consumer protection and agriculture (Art. I-13).  
 
      Following the Treaty-Constitution, the EU’s institutional set-up will remain 
what Alberta Sbragia (1993) has correctly called “a balancing act” (see also Jacqué, 
2004). To produce policy, institutions with the task of defending the EU’s general interest 
(such as the European Commission) have to work together with institutions where the 
starting point is the national  interest (such as the C ouncil of Ministers). D uring the 
negotiations over the Treaty-Constitution, the balance  tilted in favour of those 
mechanisms strengthening the protection of the national interests. The Member States 
have tried to create an EU polity where they remain the masters of the game. First, the 
veto-right remained prominently present, notably  in procedures  for the revision of the 
Treaty-Constitution as well as in a number of crucial policy fields. Secondly, negotiations 
about decision-making in the Council of Ministers were overshadowed by the battle 
between larger and smaller Member States for the maintenance or reinforcement of their      
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respective national power. Thirdly, a new post of President of the European Council was 
created, strengthening the weight of the heads of state and government vis-à-vis the 
European Commission.  Finally,  discussions on the composition of the European 
Commission were dominated by the attachment of several Member States to their 
“national representation.”  
 
    That the Member States have actively tried to protect their own  institutional 
powers in the negotiation of the Treaty-Constitution is not surprising.  Since the 
Community’s beginning in the 1950s, governments have regularly formulated objections 
to the supranational elements in the Community method. This can be easily understood: 
EU law adopted by qualified majority in the Council of Ministers,  decisions by the 
Commission (for instance in the field of competition policy) and judgements by the Court 
of Justice can all bring effective societal change in Europe, even against the will of some 
of the Member States. This implies that the governments have – to a certain degree – lost 
direct control over their European creation and explains why they have been creative in 
inventing often complex decision-taking techniques that allow them to remain at least 
partially in charge (for a more detailed formulation, see Devuyst, 2003, 27-29).  
 
  In addition, the EU’s enlargement has not facilitated advancement to a federal or 
more supranational structure.  The United Kingdom, which joined the European 
Communities in 1973, has been a constant obstacle to such an evolution. The accession of 
ten new Member States on May 1, 2004 has not been a factor favoring greater federalism 
either. According to the theory of “institutional spillover” as formulated by Robert O. 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (1991, 22), enlargement, first appearing as an antithesis 
to effective decision-making, could in a dialectic manner become the decisive element 
that provokes institutional reform aimed at greater decision-making efficiency.  This 
theory, however, hasn’t been borne out in practice. While the larger number of Member 
States has produced the expected  centrifugal effects, it did not lead to a significant 
strengthening of the EU’s decision-making capability and of those institutions defending 
the Community’s common interest.  The federal vision of Europe is generally rejected by 
the new Member States. Former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek, 
for instance, has emphasised that  the idea of developing a European federation is 
“contrary to the way of thinking of the candidate countries which have just regained their 
independence and sovereignty” (Agence Europe, May 19, 2000, 4). Jan Zielonka (2000, 
152) has reached a similar conclusion: “political federation within an enlarged Union is 
no longer possible.” 
 
      This is the context  that can help clarify the  final  version of the Treaty-
Constitution. During the negotiations, the Member States seemed to approach decision-
making in the EU as traditional “foreign policy,” where each state must fight for a place 
at the table to ensure the defence of its own national interests. Apparently, the Member 
States have grave doubts about whether the EU political system can produce “fair” 
political solutions in the absence of their direct representation. This indicates that the EU 
is far from developing into a federation-like polity, where the members are connected by 
mutual trust and community spirit. In this sense, the negotiations over  the Treaty-
Constitution have hardly differed from the creation of the previous EU Treaties.       
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